Introduction
This case concerned a proposed claim for damages by a man who had been apprehended by the police, apparently under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983. With two exceptions, no claim for acts purportedly done or functions purportedly discharged under the Act may proceed without leave of the High Court. 2
The facts
On 8 January 2006, Mr Johnson, who has a history of mental health problems going back more than a decade, was at a property in Bootle, Merseyside. As a result of his behaviour, one of the occupants of that property summoned an ambulance. In accordance with usual practice, however, the police attended as well. Mr Johnson acknowledged that he had needed medical help, but he said he had not wanted the police to be called. 3 On the basis of the witness statements and expert evidence, there is clearly a profound conflict between the parties as to what happened next. 4 It would seem to be common ground, however, that: (a) CS gas was sprayed at Mr Johnson, resulting in severe skin blistering and damage to the left side of his face, his left ear and his chest. The limitation period for a false imprisonment claim is six years, 9 so it will not expire until January 2012.
It is now accepted, however, that the limitation period for a claim of assault is a mere three years. 10 The application for permission to proceed was therefore made two-and-a-half months out-of-time.
The issue
Mr Johnson asked the court to waive the limitation period in this case, and also to give leave so that his claim could proceed to trial. For present purposes, the chief question was as to the test the court should apply when considering an application for leave.
The existing test
The leading authority on section 139 (2) 
Submissions
For the defendant chief constable, it was argued that, 25 years on, the Winch v Jones test should be modified; that it should be tightened. 14 This argument was based upon the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), which, of course, came into effect subsequently. They say that summary judgment may be given where a claim (or, for that matter, a defence) has "no real prospect of success". 15 It was argued that this should also be the test in section 139(2) cases, and two authorities were put forward for this proposition:
(a) In Menagh v Chief Constable of Merseyside, a claim for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution was struck out after close of proceedings, because there was no direct evidence to support it and "no cogent or positive evidence" to support the inferences that would therefore have to be drawn if the claim was to succeed. 16 (b) In Khadine v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, there was no evidence to support a claim that was based simply on a series of challenges to what was said by police witnesses. 17
Furthermore, the defendant argued that civil procedure had changed since the test was first approved. In those days, on interlocutory hearings, the court simply assumed the correctness of the facts set out in the particulars of claim. In Winch v Jones, for example, it was said to be "no part of the judge's duty, on an application for leave, to conduct a trial on affidavits".
"The purpose is to see whether the evidence before him adds up to the answer: if this allegation were tried out, there is no realistic possibility that the case might succeed. It is not, in my judgment, permissible to go further." 18
Now, however, the court must consider all the evidence available, to see whether the claim had a real prospect of success.
Decision
The judge, Coulson J, said that, notwithstanding the changes wrought by the CPR, "it would be wrong to modify in any significant way" the Winch v Jones test. 19 It was, after all, approved, at least in passing, in Seal, and furthermore: Ibid. 21 Ibid, at [13] .
